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ABSTRACT
Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of
motivation. Employees are “rational cheaters,” who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk
when the perceived marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost. Managers respond to this decision
calculus by implementing monitoring and incentive pay practices that lessen the attraction of shirking.
This “rational cheater model” is not the only model of opportunistic behavior, and indeed is viewed
skeptically by human resource practitioners and by many non-economists who study employment
relationships.
We investigate the “rational cheater model” using data from a double-blind field experiment that
allows us to observe the effect of experimentally-induced variations in monitoring on employee
opportunism. The experiment is unique in that it occurs in the context of an ongoing employment
relationship, i.e., with the firm’s employees producing output as usual under the supervision of their
front-line managers. The results indicate that a significant fraction of employees behave roughly in
ccordance with the “rational cheater model.” We also find, however, that a substantial proportion of
employees do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to
employee assessments about their general treatment by the emp loyer.
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Introduction 
Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a very specific 
theory of motivation.  Employees are “rational cheaters.”  They anticipate the consequences of 
their actions and shirk when the perceived marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal 
cost.  Firms respond to this decision calculus by implementing monitoring and incentive pay 
policies that make shirking unprofitable. 
Although the “rational cheater” model is ubiquitous in economics, it is often viewed 
skeptically by human resource practitioners and the other social science disciplines that study 
employment relationships (see Baron and Kreps, 1999,  Kreps, 1997, March, 1994, and Pfeffer, 
1996).  The validity of the rational cheater model is an empirical question that is, in principle, 
easy to investigate.  If employees are rational cheats then, conditional on a given incentive pay 
arrangement, a reduction in monitoring will lead to an increase in shirking.  The most powerful 
sanction available to employers is typically dismissal.  Thus, an increase in shirking resulting 
from reduced monitoring should be greatest among individuals for whom the ongoing 
employment relationship is least valuable. 
Empirical investigation of the rational cheater model is hindered by two almost 
insurmountable problems.  First, truly rational cheaters are most likely to engage in shirking 
behavior when it is hard or expensive to detect.  Second, should any association between 
monitoring and employee actions be found, it will be very difficult to disentangle the effects of 
monitoring strategies from responses to other, unobserved features of the firm’s employees or its 
human resource system.  Resolving these problems requires an experimental setting in which 
monitoring levels are exogenously varied across similar sites and substantial resources are 
devoted to tracking the behaviors of employees (Rebitzer 1995). 
This paper presents the results of just such an experiment.  The data were collected by a 
large telephone solicitation company.  The employees in this company work at 16 geographically 
dispersed sites.  At each call center, telephone solicitors were paid according to the same 
 
  
modified piece rate incentive scheme, one in which salary increased with the number of 
successful solicitations.1  This piece rate, together with imperfect information on the outcome of 
pledges, created incentives for employees to falsely claim that they had solicited a donation.2  To 
curb opportunistic behavior, the employer monitored for false donations by calling back a 
fraction of those who had responded positively to a solicitation.  “Bad calls” were calls in which 
donations previously reported by employees were repudiated by donors.   
Employees at the company were informed when hired that their activities would be 
checked by “call backs” made by management at the company’s central headquarters.  The 
results of each week’s call backs were communicated to both employees and their immediate 
supervisors, and the bad calls were deducted from each individual’s weekly incentive pay.  
Stronger sanctions for bad calls were not generally imposed on employees because the number of  
bad calls was a noisy indicator of cheating.  The noise resulted from the fact that donors 
sometimes changed their mind after agreeing to pledge money.   
The costs of call backs are substantial; each audit costs as much as the original 
solicitation call.  To reduce these monitoring costs, the CEO of the firm wanted to operate with 
as small an audit rate as necessary.  In an attempt to study the effects of reducing oversight, the 
company conducted a controlled field experiment.  This experiment was “double blind” in the 
sense that neither the employees nor their immediate supervisors were aware of departures from 
“business as usual.”  In the experiment, the employer varied the fraction of bad calls that were 
reported back to employees and supervisors at each of its 16 calling units (what we call the 
                                                 
1   During the period of the study, all solicitations were requests for donations to not-for-profit 
organizations. 
2   At the time of this study, the company’s computer system could not generate reports linking the 
outcome of a pledge to an individual caller.  In addition, the CEO of the company did not think it 
right for employees to bear the risk associated with unfulfilled donations.  It typically took weeks 
(and sometimes months) to collect the money promised in a donation.  The CEO believed that 
asking employees to postpone bonuses until the donated money arrived would undermine the 
effectiveness of the incentive pay.  For all these reasons, the company paid employees their 




observable monitoring rate), while at the same time increasing the true call back rate from 10% 
to 25% of pledges for the purpose of increasing the precision of the estimate of the true rate of 
fictitious pledges.  By analyzing the effect of varying the “observable monitoring rate,” the 
employer hoped to learn the consequences of reduced monitoring on employee behavior.  
The employer made available to us the results of the experiment.  In addition, the 
employer allowed us to collect survey data on employee attitudes towards the job, their expected 
job tenure, and the perceived difficulty of finding another, comparable job.  Other information 
collected in the survey (age, gender, work hours, educational attainment, whether an employee is 
also a student, locati`on of the call center) allow us to estimate outside earnings opportunities for 
each individual.  By matching estimates of outside options and employee perceptions with 
employee behaviors under different monitoring regimes, we can evaluate whether the employees 
for whom the job was most valuable were also the employees least likely to engage in 
opportunistic behavior. 
The experiment we analyze in this paper spans two lines of empirical research on 
incentives.  The first line of research consists of empirical studies of how work hours, effort,  
productivity, or firm performance respond to monetary rewards.3  Our research differs from 
these studies in a number of important ways.  The first and most obvious difference is that the 
variation in incentives is exogenously induced in this study and not in most others.  A second 
difference is that our study makes use of direct measures of opportunistic behavior, whereas 
most field studies rely on indirect measures.  A third and more subtle difference concerns the 
nature of the variation in incentives.  Rather than manipulating monetary payoffs, this 
                                                 
3  Examples of this literature include Berman (2000),  Bewley (2000), Cammerer, et al. (1997), 
Cappelli and Chauvin (1992), Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer (2000), Gaynor, Rebitzer and 
Taylor (2001), Hall and Liebman (1998), Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996), and Lazear 
(2000).  Some of these studies find that employees respond to incentives in ways that are roughly 
consistent with the economic model of opportunistic behavior, while others emphasize findings 
that are anomalous from the perspective of conventional economic explanations.  Prendergast 




experiment varied monitoring rates.  While every employee of the company knew that their 
reported “sales” could be checked, they did not know the actual intensity of monitoring but 
rather had to infer monitoring rates from their own experience.  Because the employee 
systematically varied both monitoring rates and the reporting of the results of the monitoring to 
employees, this experiment can shed some light on the degree to which employees actively seek 
out opportunities for shirking. 
The second body of literature relevant to our study concerns laboratory studies of 
cooperative and opportunistic behavior.  These studies find that in some laboratory settings 
individuals act in accordance with the rational cheater model, but that in other settings 
individuals engage in less opportunism than the economic model predicts (e.g., Bazerman, 
Gibbons, Thompson and Valley, 1998, and Camerer and Thaler, 1995).  The singular short-
coming of most laboratory studies is that they do not take place in the context of a persistent 
economic relationship.4   In contrast, this experiment involves manipulating incentives within an 
ongoing, real world, employment relationship.   
The results of the experiment suggest that a significant fraction of employees behave 
according to the predictions of the rational cheater model.  Specifically, we find that these 
employees respond to a reduction in the perceived cost of opportunistic behavior by increasing 
the rate at which they shirk.  On the other hand, we did not find that individuals with good 
outside options increased shirking by more than other workers when the rate of monitoring 
declined.  Furthermore, we find that a substantial proportion of employees do not appear to 
respond at all to manipulations in the monitoring rate.  This heterogeneity has important 
implications for the design of reward systems.  On the one hand, monitoring and incentives 
strategies need to regulate the margin of employees who are opportunistic.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
4   Roth and Slonim (1998) demonstrate that it is possible to run laboratory experiments with 
monetary payoffs as substantial as those found in actual economic relationships.  It is far more 




management strategies need to sustain the motivation of the substantial fraction of employees 
who are generally disinclined to shirk. 
The paper proceeds in three sections.  In the first two sections we outline a simple 
economic model of opportunistic behavior in order to clarify the relationship between the 
rational cheater model and alternative explanations of opportunism.  In the third section, we 
present our empirical findings.  The paper concludes by considering the implications of the 
behaviors we observe for economic analysis and managerial practice. 
1.  Theories of Opportunistic Behavior 
The “rational cheater” model of motivation posits that employees are self-interested 
actors who continuously probe their environment in search of ways to increase their welfare.  
Opportunistic behaviors, i.e., shirking or cheating, offer the possibility of increasing employee 
utility at the expense of the employer or customer.  According to the rational cheater model, 
employees will be opportunistic whenever they perceive that the marginal benefits of shirking 
exceed the marginal costs.  Effective management strategies manipulate the perceived costs and 
benefits of opportunism in order to reduce the attractiveness of shirking. 
The rational cheater model provides a powerful and parsimonious framework for the 
analysis of diverse employment relationships, but it is not the only theory of opportunistic 
behavior.  Two alternative approaches, associated with sociology and psychology, also have 
wide appeal outside the economics profession.  For simplicity we refer to these as the 
“conscience”  and the “impulse control” models. 
Though the rational cheater, conscience, and impulse control theories of opportunistic 
behavior have distinctive empirical predictions, they need not be presented as competing, 
mutually exclusive, explanations of behavior.  We see these explanations as conceivably 
emerging from an overarching economic model of opportunistic actions in which the distinctive 
predictions of the rational cheater, conscience, and impulse control models emerge from different 




1.1.  The Conscience Model 
In the rational cheater model, individuals evaluate behaviors in terms of their perceived  
consequences.  In the conscience model, in contrast, individuals derive utility directly from 
behaving appropriately.  The importance of  appropriate behavior is often stressed by stating that 
opportunistic actions are inconsistent with an individual’s “identity.”  In his Primer on Decision 
Making, decision scientist James March describes the ways in which the logic of appropriate 
behavior is distinct from the logic of rational cheating. 
 
When individuals and organizations fulfill identities, they follow rules or 
procedures that they see as appropriate to the situation in which they find 
themselves.  Neither preferences as they are normally conceived nor expectations 
of future consequences enter directly into the calculus…. Rule following is 
grounded in a logic of appropriateness….  The process is not random, arbitrary or 
trivial.  It is systematic reasoning, and often quite complicated.  In those respects, 
the logic of appropriateness is quite comparable to the logic of consequences.  But 
rule-based decision making proceeds in a way different from rational decision-
making.  The reasoning process is one of establishing identities and matching 
rules to recognized situations. (March, 1994, p.57-58) 
Thus a physician may treat all her patients equally regardless of their ability to pay, because this 
is the behavior consistent with her identity as a “good doctor.”  In the rational cheater model, in 
contrast, a physician derives no utility directly from the appropriateness of a behavior.  Rather, 
the physician might engage in this behavior because of the uncomfortable consequences (the 
threat of suits, professional sanctions, etc.) of discriminating among patients. 
In terms of conventional microeconomic models, the passage quoted from March 
describes the psychological processes that determine the subjective cost of opportunism to an 
individual.  When people say that honesty is core to their personal identity, they are saying that 
the psychological cost of inappropriate or unethical behavior is very high—so high that they will 
not actively investigate opportunities for shirking.  This same idea is echoed in the sociological 
and criminological literature on the role of shame and embarrassment as mechanism of social 
control separate from systems of formal sanctions (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Nagin and 




In the context of employment relationships, the “conscience” model suggests a very 
different way of managing employment relationships than the rational cheater model.  Instead of 
manipulating the expected consequences of opportunistic actions, managers need to structure the 
employment relationship so that employees adopt identities inconsistent with opportunism.  
Some economic theorists incorporate models of appropriate behavior into models of 
employment relationships.  Akerlof (1982), for example, argues that paying high wages 
encourages employees to behave according to the rules relating to “gift exchange.”  The resulting 
sense of reciprocity and mutual obligation reduces opportunism.  Kreps (1997) discusses the 
possibility that introducing monetary incentives and/or close supervision undermines social 
identities that result in “intrinsic motivation” to do a good job.  Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer 
(2000), and Kandel and Lazear (1992), analyze the role peer pressure plays in determining 
equilibrium levels of work effort.5  
Some human resource managers emphasize the importance of supervisor expectations in 
shaping employee behavior (Livingston, 1969).  Supervisors that expect high levels of 
performance alter the goals and self-perception of employees in performance enhancing ways.  
These self-fulfilling expectations can make the job of managing opportunism particularly 
complex.  If heavy handed monitoring sends the message that managers expect employees to be 
shirkers, it may undermine the intrinsic motivations that limit opportunism.  It is possible then, 
under the conscience model, that increases in monitoring may actually increase employee 
malfeasance (see also Drago, 1989).  
1.2  Impulse Control 
Impulse control theories of opportunistic behavior derive from psychology.  A central 
feature is the observation that the attractiveness of a reward is inversely proportional to the delay 
in receiving it.  The desirability of near-term rewards is not the sort one would expect on the 
                                                 
5   Bowles and Gintis (1986) rely on the inconsistencies in the logic of appropriate action in different 




basis of rational discounting.  Rather, individuals put inordinately high value on immediate 
payoffs—preferring the gratification of a near-term reward at the cost of payoffs with 
substantially higher present value that are only slightly delayed.   
Frank (1988) argues that opportunism in economic relationships stems from the way 
human brains have evolved to react to near-term rewards.   
 
The addict’s problem, apparently, differs in degree, not in kind, from one we all 
face—namely, how to accord distant penalties and rewards a more prominent role 
in our behavior.  We are all addicts of a sort, battling food, cigarettes, alcohol, 
television sportscasts, detective novels, and a host of other seductive activities.  
That our psychological reward mechanism tempts us with pleasures of the 
moment is simply part of what it means to be a person.  In the face of the 
behavioral evidence, it seems hardly far-fetched to suppose that rational 
assessments, by themselves, might often fail to assure behaviors whose rewards 
come mostly in the future (Frank,  1988, p. 88). 
Thus, in spite of the best efforts of families, schools and religious institutions, human societies 
produce a substantial number of individuals who engage in opportunistic behavior because they 
do not have sufficient impulse control to pass up the immediate rewards from cheating.  Indeed, 
prominent theories of antisocial behavior in criminology and psychology emphasize the central 
role of poor impulse control in criminal behavior.6   
The impulse control model has distinctive implications for shirking in employment 
relationships.  Firms will try to screen out employees with impulse control problems, but none of 
the usual methods (psychological tests, interviewing and checking references) will be completely 
reliable.  Firms will therefore have a proportion of employees who will find the short-term gains 
from shirking quite irresistible.  Regulating these impulses requires the imposition of costs that 
are as immediate and near at hand as the gains from shirking.  Frank (1988) argues that the key 
psychological role of a conscience is to impose immediate costs to offset the immediate gains 
from shirking.  Thus, in contrast to the prediction of the conscience model, a reduction in the 
short-term costs of shirking should result in an increase in shirking behavior.  The longer-term 
                                                 




costs of shirking (i.e., the threat of job loss in the future) will have little effect on behavior.  In 
contrast to the rational cheater model, we would not expect shirking behavior to be strongly 
related to the value of the employment relationship to the employee. 
2.  A Model of Opportunistic Behavior 
In this section we present a simple model of the firm’s incentive design problem that 
incorporates the rational cheater, impulse control and conscience models.  
Consider the employer to be a profit maximizing firm where profits are: 
(1)   ) ( ) ( ]] ) 1 ( ) ( [ [ ] ) ( [ m c c m e r b w e r                . 
The firm’s revenues are determined by: r(e), the legitimate pledges earned by a worker who puts 
in effort e; , a mean-zero random term; and , a constant ranging between 0 and 1.  Parameter   
is determined by both the fraction of donations the firm keeps (as a commission from the client 
organization) and the fraction of pledges that are honored.  We assume r’> 0 and r’’< 0.   
Compensation to employees is determined by w, the fixed component, and b, a linear bonus 
based on legitimate pledges as well as undetected “cheats.”  We use c to represent the number of 
such bad calls in a period and m to represent the rate at which calls are monitored by the 
employer.  Bad calls, i.e. donations reported by employees but subsequently repudiated by 
donors, are costly to the firm’s reputation and annoying to the firm’s clients because they cause 
the firm to try to collect money from people who deny they ever intended to contribute money.7  
We represent these costs by (c), where ’>0.  Monitoring is also expensive and we represent 
these costs by (m), where ’(m) >0 . 
We write the current period utility, U,  of a risk neutral worker as: 
(2)  ) ( ] ) 1 ( ) ( [ c e c m e r b w U           
                                                 
7   The company we study had as clients large non-profits who were very eager to protect their good 
reputations.  In order to retain the trust of these clients, the phone company discouraged its 





where e is the monetized disutility of effort and  (c) is the subjective psychological cost of 
cheating.8 
The flow of utility from the current job in period t is 
(3)    ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( ] ) 1 ( ) ( [ 1 A t t V pq pqV c e c m e r b w V              
where  is the gross discount rate, VA is the lifetime utility of the “alternative” to the current job, 
p is the probability a worker is not detected cheating enough times to warrant dismissal and q is 
the exogenous probability that a worker stays on the job next period, given that she is not 






p .  This last condition says that as the firm increases monitoring, the effect of a 
cheat on dismissal probabilities becomes more pronounced.  Conversely, at monitoring rates of 0 
the marginal effect of c on p is 0. 
In our set-up, as in the experiment we examine below, the firm has two incentive 
instruments—pay (determined by w and b) and monitoring (m)—to regulate two employee 
activities—effort expended in soliciting pledges (e) and the number of bad calls (c).  
We consider first the case in which the direct marginal disutility from making bad calls, 
’(c), is high enough that none are made.  This frees the firm to adopt a first-best compensation 
strategy, i.e., m=0 and b is set to ensure optimal effort, b* = .  In other words, the worker is 
paid as if she were a residual claimant to the enterprise.9  The fixed component of compensation, 
w, is set to meet a participation constraint and is otherwise irrelevant to our problem.  
                                                 
8   The function (c) treats the dissatisfaction from shirking as a purely private affair.  Many 
sociologists would prefer a set-up that treats the disutility of opportunism as an endogenous 
function of the social setting—especially the degree of opportunism prevailing among other 
employees.  In such an expanded model, social comparisons influence the equilibrium level of 
shirking without altering the intrinsic disutility associated with c.  When these social comparisons 
are important, the equilibrium level of cheating will be greater than would prevail in the absence 
of social norms (Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer, 2000, and Kandel and Lazear, 1992) . 




The “rational cheater” perspective refers to settings where the firm cannot depend on 
intrinsic motivation to limit cheating.  In this setting the worker chooses c, and e in order to 
maximize: 
(4)  .  ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( ] ) 1 ( ) ( [ 1 A t V pq pqV c e c m e r b w             
The first-order conditions for a worker’s choice of optimal effort (e*) and cheating (c*) are, 
respectively,10 
(5a)   br , and   0 1 ) ( '
*   e
(5b)   0 *) ( ' ] [ ) 1 ( 1  


    c
c
p
V V q m b A t   . 
The firm maximizes profits (1) given these response functions—choosing an optimal b and m.  It 
is easy to demonstrate that in contrast to the case in which “conscience” is the sole constraint on 
opportunism, the firm will operate with a positive level of monitoring and relatively lower-
powered incentives (b<).  The need for a positive level of monitoring is obvious, and the 
intuition behind the firm’s use of lower-powered incentives is also clear.  When a worker is 
already inclined to cheat, this inclination will be stronger the higher is the bonus b.  While a 
high-powered incentive (high b) is helpful in motivating effort, the use of this incentive must be 
muted because it provides a strong incentive to cheat.11 
Rewriting (5b), we notice that the “cheating condition” can be written  
(6)  ) ( ' ] [ ) 1 ( 1 c
c
p
V V q m b A t  


      . 
The left hand side of the inequality is the marginal material benefit of cheating while the right 
hand side is the marginal cost.  The second component on the right hand side is the effect of 
                                                 






p    
11   The logic is the same as in multi-tasking models such as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and 
Baker (1992).  The concern in such models is that when a firm places an incentive on a metered 
task, it risks reducing the effort an employee will undertake on a second valuable (but unmetered) 
task.  In our setting the two tasks—both valuable from the firm’s perspective—are making sales 
and preserving the integrity of the firm.  A high-powered bonus encourages more of the first task 




“conscience” which could for some individuals be large enough to dissuade cheating altogether.  
For workers with an insufficiently strong conscience, the first component on the right hand 
side—involving the cost of potential job loss—is crucial.  All else equal, a worker is disinclined 
to cheat when the job is valuable (q and [Vt+1-VA] are large) and when  is large.  Monitoring 
provides the key link between the incentive and desired behavior; the worker limits cheating 
thanks to fear of detection and dismissal from a valued job.  For a worker with an extreme 
impulse control problems, though, who deeply discounts future events (0), the monitoring 
rate is largely irrelevant because the threat of job loss is not of immediate concern.12 
If individuals are neither extremely myopic nor completely bound by conscience, i.e., if 
they are rational cheaters, the relationship between monitoring and cheating is clear: the lower 
the rate of monitoring in a period the higher will be the incidence of cheating.13  A reduction in 
monitoring increases the payoff to the marginal cheat while reducing its expected cost.   
It is worth considering a case in which initially the firm has set the monitoring rate high 
enough that there is virtually no cheating among a group of workers for whom there is 
heterogeneity in the value placed on the ongoing employment relationship.  If the monitoring 
rate is then reduced, observed increases in cheating would likely be most pronounced among 
workers who place a low value on the job.  It is for these workers that the inequality (6) first 
becomes binding (and thus c becomes positive) as m declines. 
3.  Experimental Design and Empirical Analysis. 
3.1.  The Setting and Design of the Experiment 
The telephone marketing firm we study had 16 geographically dispersed sites.  The job of 
the employees working at these sites was to call potential donors and request contributions.  
                                                 
12   In the economics literature, impulse control is often modeled using something other than 
conventional discounting (Rabin, 1998).  Introducing hyperbolic (or other non-standard) 
discounting would complicate the exposition without changing the basic point we wish to make. 
13   If the reduction in monitoring persists for a long time into the future the net effect is more 




Employees were paid a base salary and also earned a bonus for exceeding pledge targets.  As 
employees approached the target, the marginal benefit of cheating approached the value of the 
bonus.   
Employees were hired with the understanding that some number of their pledges would 
be checked by a call back or audit.  The practice at the firm was to inform employees and 
supervisors at the end of the week about the number of bad calls detected during the week.  Bad 
calls were deducted from an employee’s pay.  Some bad calls were likely to be the result of bad 
luck.  Other bad calls more likely reflected employee malfeasance.  We refer to calls of this latter 
type as suspicious bad calls.  The incidence of suspicious bad calls (SBCs) is a noisy indicator of 
shirking.14  An employee with a few SBCs was not subject to heavy discipline, but those with an 
unusually large number of suspicious bad calls could ultimately be dismissed. The rate or 
frequency of call-backs was not revealed to employees, but could be inferred from the number of 
bad calls deducted from paychecks at the end of each week. 
The design of the experiment was quite simple.  For the sixty weeks prior to the 
experiment, the company had reduced call back rates at all sites from 25% to 15% to 10% (see 
Table 1 for a description).   On June 1
st 1994, the call-back rate for 12 sites was reduced from 
10% to 5%.  This reduction in audit rates freed up the resources needed to increase monitoring to 
25% at the four remaining sites.  At these four sites, the audit rate “observed” by employees and 
supervisors was manipulated by reporting back the results taken from a randomly drawn sub-
sample of the actual call-backs made.  The manipulation of the observable audit rate at the four 
                                                 
14   Call-backs happened within hours of the recorded pledge.  Suspicious bad calls were defined as 
call-backs where the phone number was disconnected or where the individual reached claimed 




experimental sites is presented in Table 1.  The experimental design allowed for both inter- and 
intra-site comparisons.15 
The verification data from call-backs was made available to us in two forms: aggregate, 
weekly data for all 16 sites, and individual level data for employees working in the four 
experimental sites.   The aggregate data extends 60 weeks prior to the experimental manipulation 
of audit rates and the experiment took place over 14 weeks.  We therefore describe the 
experiment as beginning in week 60, although strictly speaking, individuals will have no 
knowledge of the manipulation of the monitoring rates until the end of week 61. 
3.2.  Results Using Aggregate, Site Level Data 
Weekly data on the ratio of suspicious bad calls to good calls (i.e., pledges that were 
verified by a call-back) was collected for all 16 sites for 60 weeks prior to the June 1
st 
experiment and for the duration of the experiment.   
We investigate the effect of audit rates on suspicious bad calls in a regression framework.  
The left hand side of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest.   
Columns (1) through (4) of Table 2 analyze the ratio of suspicious bad calls to the number of 
verified calls; columns (1) and (2) are linear probability models and (3) and (4) are grouped 
logits.  The right hand side variables in these estimates were  the observable audit rate from the 
previous week, hours worked at the site during week t,  the fraction of work hours attributed to 
employees with eventual tenure less than 2-3 weeks, and the fraction of hours spent on 
“outreach.”  Outreach refers to calls made to previous donors as opposed to “cold calls.”  In 
addition to these variables, the estimates in Table 2 include site dummy variables. 
The key results from Table 2 are that observable audit rates in the previous week have a 
substantial effect on bad calls in the current week.  This relationship, however, is strongest when 
                                                 
15   The four experimental sites were chosen because the number of donations and bad calls at these 
sites appeared to move relatively closely together.  The observable monitoring rates listed in 




the audit rate is set to zero.  Thus, from columns (1) and (2), we see that sites having observable 
audit rates of zero in week t experience a 0.03 point increase in the ratio of suspicious bad calls 
to verified good calls in week t+1.  This point estimate is substantial considering that the mean 
value of the dependent variable is 0.02.16  The logit models in (3) and (4) yield results of similar 
magnitude.  While the sharpest changes in behavior occurred at a 0 observable audit rate, the 
effects of monitoring are statistically significant (and with the expected sign) at higher audit rates 
as well.   
3.3.  Monitoring and the Suspicious Bad Calls Made by Individuals 
The analysis presented in Table 2 relies on aggregate, site level data to investigate the 
determinants of SBCs.  The company also made available to us data on the number of audited 
bad calls made by individual employees for each of the 14 weeks of the experiment. 
Unfortunately, we were not given any information about employees who did not make bad calls.  
Thus in order to estimate the response of individuals to variations in the observable audit rates, 
we need to find a sample of employees at work during the experiment and match these with the 
data on individual bad calls provided by the company. 
One sample of employees is derived from a survey we administered to employees 
working at the four experimental sites on two days in week 60.17  Assuming that those who 
answered the survey in week 60 were still employed in week 62, we can use these data to 
estimate how the experimental manipulation of the observable audit rate in week 61 influenced 
the bad call rates of individuals in week 62.  A second benefit of this employee survey is that it 
                                                 
16   In the first stage of the study, when 25%  of successful calls were audited, call centers reported 1 
verified “good” call per hour worked.  This suggests that employees were making roughly 4 
“sales” per hour or 160 for a 40 hour week.   
17   The survey was conducted at the company work sites by researchers from Carnegie Mellon.  All 
respondents were assured that their  responses would be completely confidential and that no one 
from the company would know how they answered the questions.  The response rate was nearly 
100%, in part because the survey could be filled out very quickly during work hours and 




collected information about the perceived value of the job to employees.  We use this 
information in subsequent sections to investigate more directly the role that the value of the job 
plays in shaping employee behavior.  
Table 3 Panel A presents the data on suspicious bad calls from our sample of employees 
working at the four experimental sites in week 60.  Column (1) reports the number of 
respondents, while columns (2) and (3) report the total number of suspicious bad calls in weeks 
61 and 62.  These increased substantially at the site with an observable audit rate of 0%, Site D.  
There is no clear pattern of change for the other three call centers.   
Employees learn about audit rates at the end of the week, when the bad calls are 
subtracted from their incentive pay.  Thus by comparing the behaviors of those who “got away” 
with a SBC in week 61 with those who did not, we can learn about the response of employees to 
monitoring.  Column (4) in Panel 3A lists the number of employees at each site who “got away” 
with an SBC, i.e., who had at least one suspicious bad call that was not reported back to them in 
week 61.  Column (5) reports the rate of suspicious bad calls for these employees in the week 
after they had a non-reported SBC (week 62).  Column (5) is best interpreted in comparison to 
column (6), the rate of SBCs for those who did not have on unreported SBC.  The comparison 
suggests that the SBC rate in week 62 is higher for those with unreported SBCs in week 61.  This 
difference is especially pronounced in Sites D and B.   
If the results in Panel A of Table 3 reflect opportunistic behavior, we should observe 
different patterns when we investigate non-suspicious bad calls, i.e., bad calls that are purely the 
result of an employee’s bad luck.  Panel B presents data on the number of non-suspicious bad 
calls (NSBCs) made by our sample of employees at the four experimental sites.  NSBCs were 




or otherwise changed their mind about contributing.18  Since NSBCs are due to bad luck and 
SBCs are due to an unobserved combination of bad luck and employee malfeasance, comparing 
the results in panels A and B  should give us some insight into the role that luck and malfeasance 
play in the experiment.   
In Panel B we observe that the number of NSBCs fell for three of the four sites during the 
experiment and, unlike the pattern for suspicious bad calls, the site with an observable audit rate 
of zero (Site D) did not experience an upsurge in NSBCs.  Columns (4) through (6) track the 
behavior of those who “got away” with a non-suspicious bad call in week 61.  Contrary to the 
results for suspicious bad calls in Panel A, we do not find a dramatic difference between 
respondents who had at least one NSBC in week 61 and those who did not.  In stark contrast to 
the results in Panel A,  we find that in Site D those with non-reported NSBCs in week 61 actually 
had fewer NSBCs per respondent in week 62 than other respondents.  The conclusion we draw is 
that the results in Panel A of Table 3 reflects some degree of employee malfeasance. 
Table 4 analyzes the data in Table 3 in a regression framework.  The estimates in column 
(1) regress the number of SBCs in Week 62 against the number of audited, but not reported, 
SBCs in Week 61.  The relationship between not-reported SBCs and SBCs in the following week 
is positive and strongly statistically significant.  The behavioral significance of the coefficients is 
also large.  For every not-reported SBC in Week 61 we observe 1.27 SBCs in Week 62.   
Columns (2) through (5) of Table 4 investigate the robustness of these results.  Column 
(2) introduces as a covariate the reported SBCs in the previous week.  This variable proves to be 
behaviorally and statistically insignificant.  Column (3) substitutes not-reported NSBCs for 
reported SBCs, and column (4) reports estimates when both variables are included in the 
                                                 
18   The distinction between SBCs and NSBCs is consistent with the beliefs of company managers.  
One of the benefits of call-backs for the company is that they provided an opportunity to “save” 




regression.  Findings in these columns suggests that it is unreported “suspicious bad calls” rather 
than bad calls per se that are influencing employee behavior.  
In the experiment, observable audit rates were varied exogenously across sites, but 
individual employees were not randomly assigned to call centers. Thus the possibility remains 
that opportunistic behavior is due to cross-site differences in employees rather than observable 
audit rates.  Column (5) partially addresses this issue by introducing covariates measuring 
employee characteristics taken from the employee survey.  The variables measure job tenure, 
weekly hours usually worked at this job,  monthly income from the job, educational attainment, 
number of dependents and marital status.  We find that the coefficient on Not-reported SBC’s in 
Week 61 is very similar to that in column (1).   
The coefficients in Table 4 suggest that employees do engage in opportunistic behavior 
when suspicious bad calls are not reported.  The aggregate data in Table 2 suggests that 
opportunistic behaviors are most visible when monitoring rates are set close to 0.  The individual 
data summarized in Table 3 suggests that much of the action occurs when observable monitoring 
rates were set to 0 at Site D.  This raises the possibility that what we are calling opportunistic 
behavior is, instead, the result of some feature of Site D other than the observable audit rate.  In 
principle it should be possible to investigate this interpretation of the results because later on in 
the experiment, the observable audit-rate at Site D is increased and other sites are given an 
observable audit rate of 0.  Thus by extending our analysis of individual data beyond week 62, 
we can conduct both intra and inter-site comparisons 
In order to extend our analysis, though, we need to observe employee behavior beyond 
week 62.  The turnover rate at the company was sufficiently high and weekly hours were 
sufficiently irregular that we cannot safely assume that all of the employees who filled out our 
survey in week 60 would be at work in each week of the experiment.  We therefore needed to 
construct a sample of employees who were employed at the company at points in time after week 
62.  Unfortunately, as we noted above, the company only supplied us information on the 




We can circumvent this data limitation by examining employees who made non-
suspicious bad calls.  An employee with at least one non-suspicious bad call in a week must have 
been at work during that week. Non-suspicious bad calls, as we discussed above, are believed by 
the employer to be the result of bad luck rather than bad actions.  We can, therefore, treat the 
employees with any NSBCs in a week as a sample of employees at work during week t.  
Assuming, as we did in Tables 3 and 4, that an employee at work in week t will be at work in 
weeks t+1 and t+2, we can use the information on NSBC’s to construct a rolling, short-term, 
longitudinal data set that allows us to estimate the determinants of SBC’s from weeks 62-74 of 
the experiment.  Specifically, we can estimate the following equation for an individual i at site s 
in week t+2 who had at least one NSBC in weeks t  and /or t+1.  
(7)  SBCist+2 =  o +  1(Not-Reported SBC)ist+1 + ist+1 
where ist+1 is a mean zero error term assumed to be uncorrelated with Not-Reported SBCist+1.   In 
order for this last condition to hold, NSBC in week t+1 must be uncorrelated with SBCs in week 
t+2.19  Estimates in Table 4  indicate that NSBCs in week 61  are not correlated with SBCs in 
week 62 of the experiment.  We assume that it this also the case in subsequent weeks. 
 Table 5 presents estimates of the relationship between not-reported suspicious bad calls 
in week t-1 and SBCs in week t.  The list of employees generated by each week’s list of NSBCs 
yields an unbalanced time-series cross sectional sample that includes 461 individuals who appear 
on average 3.5 times in the panel.  Some individuals appear more than 10 times in the sample 
and others only twice. 
For purposes of comparison (to Table 4), column (1) of Table 5 estimates the effect of 
not-reported suspicious bad calls in week 61 on SBCs in week 62.  The results here are very 
close to the results we obtained using the sample of employees who responded to our survey in 
                                                 
19    To see this, remember that individuals are included in our rolling sample if NSBC >0 in week t+1 
and/or t.  If NSBCt+1 was positively correlated with SBCt+2, this selection rule would, in effect, be 
selecting our sample on the basis of the dependant variable.   Thus individuals in our sample with 




week 62.  A non-reported SBC in week 61 results in 1.3 additional SBCs in week 62.  Column 
(2) repeats the regression for the sample of employees from all the weeks of the experiment.  The 
estimated coefficient on Not Reported SBCs in Week t-1 falls substantially but remains positive 
and both statistically and behaviorally significant; a non-reported suspicious bad call in week t-1 
leads to 0.5 additional SBC’s in week t.20  Column (3) shows that the inclusion of site and week 
dummies does little to alter this estimate.  
What explains the fall in the coefficient on Not Reported SBC’s in Week t-1 in estimates 
that extend beyond week 62?  We find clues to a plausible answer by noting previously discussed 
patterns in the data.  From Table 2, we observe that much of the response to changes in audit 
rates occurred in sites where the observable call-back rate was set close to zero.  We also know, 
from Tables 3 and 4, that much of the response to “getting away” with a bad call happens within 
the first week of the incident and that there is a great deal of individual heterogeneity in 
response.  Thus, in the most responsive call center, Site D, we find 16 out of 39 respondents 
increased SBCs between week 61 and week 62.  Analogous numbers for sites A, B and C are, 
respectively, 4 out of 40, 11 out of 50, and 9 out of 27.21 
Based on these findings, it seems that a substantial fraction of the employees (especially 
at site D and especially in week 62) responded quickly and aggressively to a regime of 0 
monitoring.  If these highly responsive employees figure out early that “no one is watching,”  it 
is reasonable to suppose that “getting away” with further bad call in later weeks will have 
relatively little additional effect on the behavior of the employee.  In short, the estimates in 
                                                 
20   If we re-estimate the equation in column (2) of Table 5 for weeks 63 and beyond the coefficient 
on Not  Reported SBC’s in Week t-1 is 0.38 with a t-statistic of  8.14.   
21   In an appendix to this paper, we present additional evidence for heterogeneity from the rolling 
sample of employees constructed for weeks 62 to74.  For each week's sample, we calculated the 




percentile.  Averaging these across weeks, we find that the average employee at the median of the 
distribution made virtually no SBC's. In contrast, the “average” employee at the 95
th percentile of 




columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 are “averaging” the large early reaction by some workers with 
more muted subsequent responses.   
If the heterogeneity/rapid response explanation in the previous paragraph is correct, the 
rapid response of employees requires an explanation.  How it is that some employees change 
behavior dramatically in response to one or two weeks’ experience with 0 monitoring?  We can 
illustrate the nature of this problem with some simple “back of the envelope” calculations.  If 
10% of  calls were monitored, and an employee made an average of 120 good calls per week and 
4 deliberate SBCs per week, and 8% of “good” calls are falsely classified as suspicious,  the 
probability of having zero reported SBCs in a week is 0.25.  Such a worker would thus not think 
it too unusual to have zero reported SBCs in a given week or even for two consecutive weeks.  
However, when the monitoring rate is 0, even a minimal amount of communication between 
workers would allow workers to infer that the monitoring rate declined.  For example, if three 
workers talking at the water cooler each confirmed having 0 SBCs, they would correctly notice 
that this is unusual (an event with probability 0.016 given our “back of the envelope” 
assumptions).  If these workers then compared notes with additional workers or noticed the 
absence of SBCs for a second week, they would very quickly ascertain that the monitoring rate 
had declined.22 
The regressions in Table 5 estimate the effect of “getting away” with a bad call on 
subsequent behavior.  In interpreting these results, we note that our key variable, not-reported 
suspicious bad calls, is a rather noisy measure of getting away with bad calls in a week.  There 
                                                 
22   Most of the action in the experiment occurred at the zero-monitoring site.  Clearly the inference 
problem is easier for workers at this site.  In addition, the psychology literature shows that 
individuals often fail to correctly assess the odds of “getting caught” in circumstances such as the 
one we study.  Kahenman and Tversky (1979) suggest that individuals overstate the likelihood of 
small probability bad events (such as getting caught fabricating a sale), but perceive zero 
probabilities accurately.  These psychological biases concerning risky decisions would cause 
employees to respond much more strongly to a monitoring rate of 0 percent than say 2 percent 
even though the difference between those monitoring rates would not otherwise be particularly 




are at least two sources of “measurement error:” error due to the fact that only a random sample 
of calls were audited, and error due to fact that some SBCs are the result of bad luck rather than 
bad actions.  As a consequence we likely have attenuation bias in our OLS estimators.  
Fortunately, we have a natural set of instruments, the exogenously-set monitoring rate prevailing 
at the site in week t-1. 
Instrumental variables estimates are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5.  In (4), 
the estimated coefficient on Not Reported SBC’s in Week t-1 is considerably larger than the 
comparable OLS estimate (3).  In (5) we also include both week and individual fixed effects.23  
We continue to find that when workers get away with bad calls, thanks to reduced monitoring, 
they respond with a subsequent increase in cheating.  The fact that these results show up in the 
IV estimation procedure gives increased confidence that the experimental manipulation of 
monitoring is causing the changed observed behavioral responses in cheating. 
3.4. Employee  Heterogeneity 
Patterns observed in Table 3 suggest considerable heterogeneity in employee responses to 
the experiment.  In this section we examine employee heterogeneity more directly.  A central 
prediction of the model of opportunism presented in Section 2 is that the employee’s  tendency to 
engage in opportunistic behavior should be related to the value of the current job relative to 
outside options.  We therefore begin our analysis of employee heterogeneity by examining 
differences in how employees value their job. 
To assess the value of the call center job, we made use of employee survey data as well 
as data on local labor market conditions taken from the US Census.  The employee survey 
(which was distributed in week 60) asked questions about employee perceptions concerning their 
job and their relationship with the employer.  Summary statistics from the employee survey are 
presented in Table 6.  The first question asks, “If you were to look for a new job in your county, 
                                                 




how easy would it be for you to find a job with about the same level of pay and benefits as this 
company?”  Nearly 60% of respondents said that it would be quite difficult or very difficult to 
find an equivalent job.  The second question asks how likely it is the employee will be at the 
current employer in one year.   More than 70% of respondents thought it almost or somewhat 
certain that they will still be employed in the next year.    
The remaining statistics in Table 6 concerns employee assessments of their treatment by 
the employer. Employees were asked to respond on a 1 to 5 scale to the following statements: 
“[the company] cares about my personal well-being;” “[the company] takes advantage of me;”  
and  “[the company] is a good place to work.”  One striking feature of these tabulations is how 
many employees have positive feelings toward the employer.  Roughly 70% of employees agree 
or strongly agree that the company cares about their well-being and more than 90% agree or 
strongly agree that the company is a good place to work.  Similarly, 71% disagree or strongly 
disagree with that the company takes advantage of them.   
To ascertain the value of outside job opportunities, we use extracts from the 1990 Census 
to estimate wage equations for the MSA or county where the call center was located.  We then 
used these estimates, together with demographic information about employees collected in the 
employee survey, to “predict” the wage that a person with similar characteristics would, on 
average, receive in the local labor market.24  The telephone solicitation company used the same 
compensation formula at all of its call centers.  Thus variations in the predicted wage in the local 
labor market is a reasonably exogenous determinant of the value of outside alternatives relative 
to working for the company. 
We use the Table 6 data on employee perceptions of their current employment 
relationship to check the plausibility of the predicted “outside” wage as a measure of the relative 
                                                 
24   The four “experimental” call centers were located in 4 different cities.  Each city was in a 
different  county and the counties were in three different states.  Thus it is reasonable to suppose 
that the four call centers were situated in distinct labor markets.  Details on the wage equations 




value of the current job.  Employees with stronger outside options should, ceteris paribus, value 
the employment relationship less and should be less likely to anticipate staying with the 
company. 
Table 7 presents ordered probit estimates of the relationship between a worker’s current 
earnings, her expected outside earning opportunities (as estimated using Census data), and her 
perception about outside opportunities, as presented in Table 6.  In column (1) we estimate the 
effect of outside options on the perceived difficulty of finding an equivalent job.  Results are as 
expected: The better an individual’s outside options, as measured by our variable Estimated 
Outside Monthly Earnings, the greater the perceived ease of finding an equivalent job.25  
Monthly Income At This Job has the opposite effect; the higher one’s current income the lower 
the perceived ease of an equivalent job. 
Column (2) in Table 7 concerns the effect of outside options on expected job tenure.  
Here we observe that neither Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings nor Monthly Income at This 
Job have a statistically significant relationship with expectations about staying at the job the next 
year.  Students, however, are less likely to stay an additional year and employees with more 
current job tenure are more likely to expect to stay an additional year. 
Columns (3) though (5) examine the relationship between outside job offers and workers’ 
assessments of treatment by the employer.  We find that the higher the Estimated Outside 
Monthly Earnings, the less likely an employee is to agree with the statement that the employer 
“cares about me” and the more likely they are to agree with the statement that the company 
                                                 
25   Point estimates indicate that the effect of Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings is substantial.  An 
increase of one standard deviation in Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings ($258), reduces the 
probability that the respondent believes an equivalent job will be “very difficult” to find by 0.129 
points.  (This point estimate was calculated in two steps.  First, we used the ordered probit 
estimates in Table 7 to estimate the probability that each individual will choose one of the four 
answers.  We then regressed the predicted probabilities of choosing “very difficult” against the 
same right hand side variables used in the ordered probit.  The resulting regression coefficients 




“takes advantage of me,” but Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings has no statistically significant 
effect on perceptions about whether the company is a “good place to work.” 
By adding together employee responses to Company Cares About Me and  Company Is 
Good Place to Work and subtracting responses to Company Takes Advantage of Me we can 
construct a general “attitude scale” that increases as employees’ attitudes towards the employer 
improves.  We present this scale in the variable ATTITUDE and examine it’s determinants in 
column (6) of Table 7.26  We find that employee attitudes towards the employer become more 
negative as their outside earnings options improve.  We also find that students are more likely to 
have negative attitudes towards the employer than other employees.  Taken together, the results 
in Table 7 indicate that measured employee perceptions of the job and the employer move in 
plausible ways with an objective and independently derived measure of outside earning 
opportunities.   
In Table 8 we investigate how employee perceptions about the value of the job and their 
attitude towards the employer shape their response to “getting away” with an SBC.  Column (1) 
of Table 8 examines how the perceived difficulty in finding an equivalent job and employee 
attitudes towards the employer influence the number of  SBCs in week 62.  We find that the 
coefficient on Not Reported SBCs Week 61 in Table 8 is virtually identical to those reported in 
Table 4.  We also observe that the coefficient on ATTITUDE is negative and statistically 
significant; people with positive attitudes toward the firm cheat less.  The coefficient on Difficult 
to Find Job is small in magnitude and not statistically significant.27    The rest of Table 8 
explores these results in more detail. 
                                                 
26   More specifically, the variable ATTITUDE = Company Cares About Me + Company Is Good 
Place to Work - Company Takes Advantage of Me where the attitude variables are standardized 
(mean 0, variance 1) versions of the employee attitude variables in Tables 6 and 7.  ATTITUDE 
has a Cronbach’s  = 0.80 
27   We also experimented with using Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings to assess the value of the 




One can view the ATTITUDE variable as entering our model of opportunism in two 
ways.  First, a positive attitude towards the employer presumably reflects feelings that, ceterus 
paribus, increase the value of the job.  Alternatively, it may be that employees with positive 
feelings towards the employer experience heightened disutility when engaging in opportunistic 
behavior that damages the employer.  This heightened disutility may be due to feelings of 
reciprocity for receiving fair treatment from the employer or may reflect a set of innate 
psychological traits (such as empathy) that make it easier to feel good about the employer and 
also raise the psychological costs of bad behavior.28   
Our model of opportunism suggests that both mechanisms should have a similar 
influence on the magnitude of any behavioral response to “getting away” with bad calls.  As we 
noted at the end of Section 2, workers who place high value on their job will likely be less 
responsive to a reduction in monitoring than workers who place a low value on the job.  It 
follows that if ATTITUDE reflects increased value of the job, we should observe that employees 
with a strongly positive ATTITUDE will be less responsive than other employees to a reduction 
in monitoring rates.  Similarly, if ATTITUDE reflects the heightened direct disutility of shirking, 
equation (6) predicts that employees with strongly positive ATTITUDE will respond less strongly 
to a fall in monitoring and many won’t respond at all. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 8 examine the effect of ATTITUDE on the response of 
employees to “getting away” with a bad call in week 61.  Column (2) is estimated for employees 
whose score on ATTIUDE is greater than or equal to the sample median and column (3) is 
estimated for employees with scores below the median.  Comparing the estimated coefficients on 
Not Reported SBCs Week 61 in columns (2) and (3) we find that employees with positive 
attitudes towards employers do indeed respond less strongly to “getting away” with an SBC than 
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly in regressions containing both Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings and Difficult to 
Find Job, the two variables were neither individually nor jointly significant. 
28   The relationship between the psychic costs of malfeasance and feelings of reciprocity towards the 




do employees with negative attitudes.  For employees with positive attitudes, having a not 
reported SBC in week 61 increases the number of  SBCs in week 62 by 0.89.  For employees 
with negative attitudes, one would expect an increase of 1.60 SBCs.  This 79% difference is both 
behaviorally and statistically significant.29   
Taken together, the results in columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate that employees with 
positive attitudes towards the employer engage in less opportunism and respond less to “getting 
away” with an SBC.  These findings do not, however, allow us to distinguish between the two 
mechanisms by which ATTITUDE may shape opportunistic behavior—increased value of the job 
or increased direct disutility from taking advantage of the employer.  We can shed some 
additional light on this question, however, by examining an alternative indicator of the value of 
the current job.  Specifically, if ATTITUDE reflects variations in the value of the job, we might 
expect our other direct measures of the value of the job to influence opportunistic behavior in 
similar fashion. 
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 8 look in more detail at  the Difficult to Find Job variable.  
We again divide the sample of employees into two groups: those who believe it would not “be 
difficult” or “very difficult” to find another equivalent job (column (4)) and those who do believe 
that finding an equivalent job would be “difficult” or “very difficult” (column (5)).  Our model 
predicts that the coefficient on Not Reported SBCs Week 61 should be smaller for those who 
value the job, in column (5), than for those who place lower relative value on the job, in column 
(4).  We find, however, exactly the opposite pattern.  “Getting away” with an SBC in week 61 is 
associated with 0.73 additional bad calls in week 62 for employees who think it would be easy to 
find an equivalent alternative job.  In contrast, an undetected SBC in week 61 is associated with 
                                                 




1.31 SBCs in week 62 for the employees in column (5).  The estimated 78% difference in 
response across the two groups of employees is behaviorally and statistically significant.30    
In short, evidence from the experiment indicates that employees with positive attitudes 
towards employers were less responsive to “getting away” with a bad call than were employees 
with negative attitudes.  If this impact of ATTITUDE were due to the variation in the value 
employees place on the job (due to the positive feelings toward the employer), we would expect 
direct measures of the value of the job to have similar effect.  Instead we observe that employees 
who believe they would have a hard time finding an equivalent job are more responsive to 
“getting away” with an SBC.  
In our experiment, employees were not randomly assigned to call centers.  Rather they 
chose to work at the call centers after considering their other opportunities in the labor market.  
From this perspective, it would not perhaps be surprising that variations in the perceived value of 
the job within the company (as reflected in Difficult to Find Job) may be too small to have a 
meaningful effect on opportunism.  Our finding that employees who place a high value on the 
job are significantly more responsive to “getting away” with an SBC is, however, harder to 
reconcile with our model of opportunism.  One possible explanation for this anomaly may rest on 
a kind of employee heterogeneity that we do not consider in our theoretical analysis.  It may be 
that employees who responded in the survey (in week 60) that their job market prospects are 
poor believed this because they understood that they had impulse control or other related 
psychological problems (such as drug or alcohol dependence) that were likely to get them in 
trouble with employers.  These impulse control problems were then revealed as the experiment 
proceeded (in weeks 61 and 62).  Similarly, it may be that employees believed that their job 
                                                 
30   The t-statistic for a test of differences in the estimated values is 2.12.  If we re-estimated 
equations (4) and (5) but divided the sample into employees with high (above the mean) and low 
(below the mean) values of predicted outside earnings, we get similar results.  Employees with 
low expected outside earnings are 37% more responsive to getting away with an SBC than other 




prospects were poor because they understood that their skills or cognitive abilities where sub-par.  
There is strong evidence from the psychological literature that cognitive skills and impulse 
control problems are correlated.31  
The explanations offered in the preceding paragraph are of course highly speculative.  
The point we wish to emphasize is that the anomalous results reported in columns (4) and (5) of 
Table 8 may be consistent with our model of opportunism if there is important and unobserved 
employee heterogeneity in “impulse control,” in worker “conscience,” or both.  Even with this 
type of employee heterogeneity, however, the fundamental mechanism of the rational cheater 
model still plays the key role: workers who have a propensity to cheat—owing to a weak 
attachment to the firm (or an underdeveloped conscience generally) or to poor impulse control—
do in fact increase their cheating when the reward to cheating increases.   
3.5.  The Economic Return to Opportunistic Behavior 
The logic of the incentive problem we have studied assumes that individual employees 
benefit financially from engaging in opportunistic behaviors.  We can use the data collected in 
this experiment to estimate the economic return from shirking. 
The equations in Table 9 regress the employee’s reported monthly income from the 
phone company against the number of suspicious bad calls (SBCs) observed in week 60.  In 
columns (1) and (3) we regress income measures against SBCs.  In columns (2) and (4) we 
include additional control variables.  The coefficient in column (2) indicates that the number of 
SBCs made in week 60 are positively associated with earnings.  Employees at the 75
th percentile 
of SBCs (i.e., those with 1 SBC in week 60) earned on average $41.00 per month more than 
employees at the median (0 SBCs in week 60).  This 5% increase above mean earnings is 
consistent with the point estimates in column (4).   
                                                 






Much of the economics literature on incentives and employment relationships focuses on 
a model of opportunism that we dub the “rational cheater model.”  In contrast, the psychological 
and sociological literature often emphasize alternative models (that we name the “conscience 
model” and the “impulse control model”).  We argue that the “rational cheater model” and its 
alternatives can be viewed as variants of an overarching model of opportunistic behavior.  We 
use this model to interpret the results of a unique field experiment that is unusually well suited 
for examining the economics of opportunistic behavior in employment relationships.   
The results indicate that a sizeable fraction of employees behave roughly in accordance 
with the “rational cheater model:” employees respond to a reduction in monitoring by quickly 
and sharply increasing the rate at which they engage in malfeasance.  We also find, however, that 
many other employees do not exploit reductions in monitoring to their own advantage.  Survey 
evidence indicates that the employees who responded quickly to reductions in monitoring tended 
to be those who perceived the employer as being unfair and uncaring.  We find suggestive but 
indirect evidence that this relationship between employee attitudes and malfeasance is more 
likely due to variations in the disutility of opportunism (as emphasized in the “conscience” 
model) than to variations in the value of the job (as emphasized in the “rational cheater” model).  
Having said this, we note that “conscience” alone is not guiding the actions of the workers we 
observe in the experiment.  Workers who are inclined toward opportunism (including, 
apparently, a number of the workers who view the employer as unfair and uncaring) take 
advantage of opportunities to cheat when the material advantage of doing so increases.  
Any general conclusions drawn from this experiment must be qualified by two key 
limitations of the experiment.  First, while monitoring was manipulated experimentally across 
sites, individual employees were not randomly assigned to call centers.  Rather they chose to 
work at the call center after comparing it to their alternatives in the local labor market.  One 
implication of this set-up is that intra-organizational variation in the value of the job (relative to 




addition, the absence of random employee assignment makes it is difficult to pin down precisely 
the role that unobserved employee characteristics play in the patterns of opportunistic behavior 
that we observe.  Second, the experiment occurred under conditions prevailing at one specific 
company.  Although the telephone solicitation company was generally viewed favorably by its 
employees, the firm also set wages close to the level that many of its employees could find 
elsewhere, and it functioned with high rates of turnover.  Employees also had only a one-time 
interaction with potential donors and little connection to the organizations on whose behalf they 
solicited funds.  Small employment rents, short expected tenures and brief one-time interactions 
with customers are probably not the best conditions in which to observe the high levels of 
intrinsic motivation that form the behavioral cornerstone of the “conscience” model.   
The behavioral heterogeneity we observe has important implications for the design and 
management of reward systems.  On the one hand, monitoring and incentives strategies are 
needed to regulate the margin of employees who are opportunistic.  On the other hand, 
management strategies need to sustain the motivation of the substantial fraction of employees 
disinclined to shirk.  Balancing this tension is tricky, but our findings suggest that management’s 
perceived empathy and fairness in dealing with employees may play an important role in 
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Observable  and Actual Audit Rates During the Experiment 
actual audit rate is in () 
 Pre-Experiment Experiment 
  Week 1-25  Week 26-44  Week 45-59  Week 60-67  Week 68-74 
“Experimental” sites           
Site A  25% (25%)  15% (15%)  10% (10%)  2% (25%)  0% (25%) 
Site B  25% (25%)  15% (15%)  10% (10%)  5% (25%)  2% (25%) 
Site C  25% (25%)  15% (15%)  10% (10%)  10% (25%)  10% (25%) 
Site D  25% (25%)  15% (15%)  10% (10%)  0% (25%)  10% (25%) 
Twelve “control” sites  25% (25%)  15% (15%)  10% (10%)  5% (5%)  5% (5%) 
   Table 2
Audits and the Rate of Suspicious Bad Calls
Sample Means Sample Means (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Sites Experimental Sites All Sites Exp. Sites All Sites Exp. Sites
SBC Rate = SBC's/Good Calls Week t 0.021 0.019 SBC Rate SBC Rate (see notes) (see notes)
OLS OLS Grouped Logit Grouped Logit
Observable Audit Rates
  dummy variables = 1 when
      Audit Rate in Week t-1 is 0% 0.031 0.031 0.966 1.089
(2.692) (2.783) (6.969) (5.357)
      Audit Rate in Week t-1 is 2% 0.006 0.006 0.359 0.394
(2.807) (1.477) (2.148) (1.704)
      Audit Rate in Week t-1 is  5% 0.019 0.008 0.949 0.702
(6.291) (1.865) (10.688) (2.945)
      Audit Rate in Week t-1 is 10% 0.002 0.007 0.383 0.651
(1.358) (16.924) (5.032) (4.170)
      Audit Rate in Week t-1 is 15% 0.002 0.002 0.405 0.463
(1.203) (3.572) (5.595) (2.969)
Hours Worked at Site Per Week 1,240.388 1,315.439 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.419) (1.052) (2.276) (1.566)
Fraction Of Workers With Eventual Tenure < 2 Wks 0.232 0.241 -0.012 0.001 0.072 -0.258
(1.417) (0.026) (0.199) (0.351)
Fraction of Hours Spent in Outreach 0.605 0.612 0.006 0.009 0.145 0.328
(3.248) (2.218) (2.100) (2.318)
Constant 0.002 0.006 -4.872 -4.657
(0.436) (0.434) (29.917) (15.344)
Call Center Fixed Effects
Observations 779 196 768 196
Adjusted R
2 0.33827 0.43271 0.43832 0.5025
SBC refers to suspicious bad calls in a week. SBC's are pledges where donor's number is disconnected or where donors claims:
  they only wanted information; they did not pledge.  Good Calls are call-backs that verified donors pledge.  Employees made an average of 4 good calls / hour.   
  The omitted observable audit rate was 25%.
 Estimates in columns (1) and (2) are linear probability models.  All t statistics are calculated using "White" standard errors.
 Estimates in columns (3) and (4) are grouped logit models.  The dependent variable is log(SBC Rate/ (1-SBC Rate))
All data in this table are taken from the 60 weeks prior to the start of the experimental manipulation of percieved monitoring rates.Table 3
Analysis of  Bad Calls Made by Survey Respondents in Weeks 61 and 62  
Panel 3A: Suspicious Bad Calls









SBC's in  
Week 61
Number of 





reported SBC in 
Week 61
SBC Rate in 




Week 62 for 
Respondents 
Not In Col (4)
A 2% 40 32 11 19 0.473 0.095
B 5% 50 41 54 15 2.733 0.371
C 10% 27 17 28 3 1.333 1
D 0% 39 81 124 21 5.286 0.722
Panel 3B: Non-suspicious Bad Calls








NSBC in  
Week 61







NSBC Rate in 




Week 62 for 
Respondent 
not in Col. 4
A 2% 40 39 14 22 0.455 0.222
B 5% 50 24 28 16 1 0.3529
C 10% 27 18 18 7 1 0.55
D 0% 39 40 27 17 0.4118 0.909
SBC refers to suspicious bad calls in a week. SBC's are pledges where donor's number is disconnected or where donors claims:
  they only wanted information; they did not pledge.
NSBC refers to non-suspicious bad calls in a week.  NSBC's are pledges for which the donor
  claims they have changed their minds about their pledge or want to cancel the pledge.Table 4
Determinants of Suspicious Bad Calls (SBC's) in Week 62
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)












Not Reported SBCs in Wk 61 1.272 1.270 1.277 1.131
(15.269) (15.163) (15.157) (10.972)
Reported SBCs in Wk 61 0.068
(0.201)
Not Reported NSBC 0.239 -0.075
(1.005) -(0.495)
Tenure (in years) 0.140
   (1.376; 1.805) (1.143)
Usual Hrs/ Wk.= 20-30 -0.090
   (0.541; 0.500) -(0.109)
Usual Hrs/ Wk. =30 -0.377
    (0.391; 0.490) -(0.407)
Currently a Student 0.636
    (0.308; 0.464) (1.263)
Monthly Income This Job 0.001
    (727.93; 268.702) (1.456)
High School or GED 0.254
    (0.383; 0.488) (0.355)
Some College or 2 Yr. College 0.007
    (0.429; 0.497) (0.010)
Degree from 4 yr. College or Grad School 0.103
    (0.098; 0.298) (0.112)
#  Dependents Who You Support 0.064
    (0.812; 1.238) (0.347)
Married -0.453
   (0.421; 0.496) -(1.017)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 156 156 156 156 156
Adjusted R 
2 0.600 0.597 0.000 0.597 0.494
SBC are suspicious bad calls.  NSBC are not suspicious bad calls
The company called back 25% of calls at experimental site, and reported a random sample of these back to employee and supervisor
Not Reported SBC are the number of suspicious bad calls not reported to employee at end of week.
Numbers in ( ) are t-statistics.  Numbers in ( ; ) under variable names are the mean and standard deviation of right hand side variables in [5]
In column [4] can reject hypothesis that coefficient on Not Reported SBC in Wk 61 is the same  as Reported in Wk 61, F(1,153)=11.67Table 5
Determinants of Suspicious Bad Calls (SBC's) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Not Reported SBC in Week t-1 1.293 0.484 0.468 0.151 0.792 0.683
(5.414) (6.320) (6.205) (4.760) (11.280) (3.820)
Other's Not Reported SBC's in 
     Week t-1
Dummy Variables for Site yes yes
Dummy Variables for Week yes yes yes yes
Dummy Variables for Individual  yes yes
R
2 0.613 0.230 0.274 0.123 0.179 0.261
Observations 132 1256 1256 1256 1256 1256
Number of Individuals 132 341 341 341 341 341
Column 1 is restricted to those with NSBC's in week 60, the rest of the columns are for the entire sample.
The instrumental variables used in columns (5) and (6) are dummy variables for the observed audit rates at a site in week t-1
The t-statistics in columns (1)-(4)  are calculated using robust standard errors allowing for clustering of observations by employee.
The t-statistics in columns (5)  and (6) are calculated using robust standard errors allowing for clustering of observations by site.  
The mean value of Others' Not Rep. SBC's in Week t-1 is 29.6 with a standard deviation of 27Table 6
Heterogeneity in Employee Attitudes About  the Job and Employer
Attitudes Towards The Job
How Easy to Find An Equivalent job? (152 respondents)
very easy quite easy quite difficult very difficult Total
13.82% 26.32% 51.32% 8.55% 100.00%
How Likely Is it That You Will Be Working for [this company] in 1 year? (153 respondents)
Almost Certain Somewhat Certain Unlikely Very Unlikely Total
39.87% 33.33% 11.11% 15.69% 100.00%
Attitudes Towards the Employer
Company Cares About Me? (155 Respondents)
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree




4.52% 9.68% 24.52% 44.52% 16.77% 100.00%
Company Takes Advangage of Me? (155 respondents)
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree




27.74% 34.19% 26.45% 5.16% 6.45% 100.00%
Company Is a Good Place To Work? (155 respondents)
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree




3.23% 3.23% 12.26% 56.13% 25.16% 100.00%Table 7
Determinants of Employee Attitudes Towards Job and Employer
ordered probit  ordered probit  ordered probit  ordered probit  ordered probit  OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
How Easy to 
Find An 
Equivalent job?
How Likely Is it 
That You Will Be 
Working for [this 














Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings -0.0020 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0007
  (z-statistic or, in col. 6,  t-statistic) -(4.159) (0.360) -(2.043) (2.290) -(0.555) -(1.930)
Monthly Income This Job 0.0015 -0.0004 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0004
  (z-statistic or, in col. 6,  t-statistic) (3.178) -(0.889) (1.805) -(0.933) (0.161) (1.180)
Currently A Student 0.0410 0.8043 -0.3288 0.6524 -0.6127 -0.4489
  (z-statistic or, in col. 6,  t-statistic) (0.158) (3.143) -(1.342) (2.595) -(2.384) -(2.200)
Current Job Tenure 0.0238 -0.1386 -0.0413 0.1494 -0.0315 -0.0730
  (z-statistic or, in col. 6,  t-statistic) (0.366) -(1.942) -(0.672) (2.408) -(0.496) -(1.440)
Observations 119 121 121 121 121 121
Log-Likelihood of ordered probit -133.10518 -141.51234 -166.84824 -166.8609 -139.52455
R
2 of ordinary least squares regression 0.0614
Estimates in columns 1-5 are ordered probits, but OLS regression produces similar results.  
Monthly Income This Job was collected from survey of employees.  
Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings  is predicted monthly earnings estimated from an earnings equation estimated for local labor
   market using 5% PUMS Census Sample.  Earnings equations are presented in an appendix
In column 1, an increase in the dependent variable means an equivalent job is more difficult to find.
In column 2 an increase in the dependent variable means the employee is less likely to stay a year
In columns 3-5 , an increase in the dependent variable means employee more strongly agrees with the statement
The mean of Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings is $599 with a standard deviation of $257
The average of Estimated Outside Monthly Earnings / Monthly Income This Job = 0.89
The variable ATTITUDE is a scale constructed from the dependent variables in columns (3)-(6).  It increases as impression of employer improves.
ATTITUDE = Company Cares About Me + Company Is Good Place to Work - Company Takes Advantage of Me.
    This scale is constructed by summing across standardized (mean 0, variance 1) variables.  Cronbach's  = 0.8Table 8








Find Job = 0
Difficult to 
Find Job= 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable
SBC in Wk 
62
SBC in Wk 
62
SBC in Wk 
62
SBC in Wk 
62
SBC in Wk 
62
 Not Reported SBCs Week 61  1.271 0.893 1.602 0.732 1.309
(14.644)** (8.699)** (11.999)** (4.070)** (12.052)**
ATTITUDE (towards employer) -0.411 -0.34 -0.391 -0.034 -1.136
(1.907) (0.641) (0.958) (0.173) (2.721)**
Difficulty to Find  Job 0.257 0.18 -0.073
(0.646) (0.419) (0.102)
Unlikely to be Working For 
Employer  in a year 0.164 0.092 -0.266 -0.02 0.683
(0.382) (0.173) (0.390) (0.041) (1.005)
Currently A Student 0.269 0.211 0.305 0.973 -0.198
(0.665) (0.421) (0.505) (1.972) (0.339)
Dummy Variables For Site yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.265 0.317 0.584 0.391 0.627
(0.547) (0.440) (0.716) (0.780) (1.028)
Observations 155 81 74 64 91
R-squared 0.642 0.562 0.733 0.333 0.706
(absolute value of t statistics)
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Difficult to Find Job  = 1 if employee claims it would be difficult or very difficult to find an equivalent job and 0 otherwise
Column 2 includes employees who indicate it would be difficult or very difficult to find an equivalent job.
Column 3 includes employees for whom it would ot be difficult (or very difficult) to find an equivalent job.
Column 4  includes employees with ATTITUDE > the median.  Column 5 includes those with ATTITUDE < the  median.Table 9
Estimates of The Effect of Shirking On Employee Earnings















SBC in Week 60 54.758 41.311 0.078 0.056
(2.970) (2.383) (2.812) (2.063)










Usual Hrs/ Wk.= 20-30 355.742 0.577
(4.713) (4.838)




Currently a Student -79.140 -0.125
-(1.596) -(1.599)
High School or GED -119.463 -0.147
-(1.800) -(1.399)
Some College or 2 Yr. College -119.744 -0.162
-(1.831) -(1.569)
Degree from 4 yr. College or Grad School -62.651 -0.129
-(0.722) -(0.940)
Constant 709.833 94.975 6.502 5.541
(29.801) (0.560) (180.263) (20.688)
Adj. R
2 0.056 0.424 0.050 0.369
Observations 133 128 133 128
All estimates are ordinary least squares.  Numbers in ( ) are t-statistics
Dependent variable is monthly income at this company as reported by employees in employee surveys
Similar estimates result if we include dummy variables for each site, and the site variables have no
  statistically significant effect on earnings.  This is consistent with the company policy of using single 
  compensation scheme for all sites.Appendix  
Earnings Equations for Each Call Center 
 
 
In order to calculate outside options for employees at different call centers, we estimated 
earnings equations for the local labor market in which the call centers were located.   The data 
we used were from the 1990 Census.  Our sample included 5% of all persons aged 16-90 who 
reported having worked in 1989.  The variables and the earnings equations we estimated are 
reported in Table A1.Table A1
Wage Equations Used To Preduct Outside Earnings for Each Site











          Mean Dependent Variable 7.1431 7.0117 7.2630 7.2080
Male 0.3423121 0.417 0.273 0.311
(15.767) (19.614) (44.792) (45.845)
Usual Hrs/ Wk.= 20-29 0.5939548 0.5319 0.5020 0.4967
(12.016) (12.019) (30.980) (32.737)
Usual Hrs/ Wk. =30 0.7583104 0.7260 0.6947 0.6859
(11.969) (11.864) (36.004) (33.839)
Usual Hrs/Wk. = 31=40 1.371219 1.2455 1.2096 1.2940
(32.207) (32.207) (32.207) (32.207)
Usual Hrs./Wk = 40+ 1.575951 1.3767 1.4463 1.5206
(33.930) (32.972) (96.225) (104.763)
Married 0.1107979 0.1255 0.1210 0.1417
(4.450) (5.097) (18.483) (18.946)
Currently a Student -0.0736 -0.0867 -0.0849 -0.0730
-(2.046) -(2.366) -(9.308) -(6.609)
High School or GED 0.0566 0.1450 0.1606 0.1197
(1.544) (4.605) (16.622) (10.722)
Some College or 2 Yr. College 0.2007 0.2316 0.3144 0.2853
(5.596) (6.859) (34.937) (24.513)
Degree from 4 yr. College or Grad School 0.4447 0.5732 0.6532 0.6428
(11.018) (15.084) (64.995) (53.245)
Age 0.0695 0.0508 0.0573 0.0529
(14.466) (11.772) (43.420) (35.619)
Age
2 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005
-(13.032) -(10.709) -(36.589) -(29.077)
Constant 4.0457 4.3712 4.3688 4.3334
(42.036) (50.390) (162.280) (144.243)
Adj. R
2 0.5796 0.502 0.4748 0.5326
Observations 3511 4632 50215 40951
All estimates are ordinary least squares.  Numbers in ( ) are t-statistics. 
The dependent variable is the log of monthly wage or salary income in 1989.  
  Monthly income is calculated by dividing wage or salary income in 1989 by usual hours worked per week
  in 1989, and multiplying by 4.3
Columns (1)-(4) are estimates for sites A, B, C and D respectively.  
Data is from the 1990 Census.  Observations are 5% of all persons who reported having worked in 1989.
   The sample for sites A and B were drawn from the county in which the sites are  located.  The sample for sites 
  C and D were taken from the MSA in which the sites are located.Appendix Table A2
The Distribution of SBC's
Across Employees and Within Sites
Avgerage Number of SBC's For Employee at
Site Obs. Audit Rate Weeks 50th Centile 80th Centile 90th Centile 95th Centile
A   2% 62-67 0.00 0.67 1.77 2.58
0% 68-73 0.17 0.97 2.00 3.10
B 5% 62-67 0.17 1.00 2.45 4.34
2% 68-73 0.17 1.27 2.70 5.20
C 10% 62-67 0.33 1.37 2.37 3.30
10% 68-73 0.00 0.57 1.25 1.33
D 0% 62-67 0.33 3.00 5.60 9.79
10% 68-73 0.33 2.23 3.63 5.48
This table presents information on the distribution of SBC's taken from the rolling sample
  of employees at the four experimental sites.  The true audit rate was 25% at these sites.
 For each week's sample, we calculated the number of SBC's for the median employee 
and for the employee at the 80th,  90th, and 95th centile.    The results in columns 4-7 
are averages calculated using each week's distribution of SBC's. 
 
   